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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion, in a case decided on equitable principles, in
setting forth the alimony award, the property division and the refusal to award
Respondent any attorney's fees. "Trial courts have considerable discretion in
determining alimony and property division in divorce cases, and will be upheld
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v.
Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). The trial court does not abuse its
discretion in considering the respective fault of the parties in apportioning such
award. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)(b). Where a party challenges the trial court's
finding of fact, the appellate court first determines whether the appellant has
marshaled all of the evidence supporting the court's findings and then
demonstrates that the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence. Chen v.
Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004).

2.

Did the trial court err in refusing to award Respondent unpaid alimony when the
trial court, as the fact finder, determined that the parties' mutual mistakes
prompted Petitioner to make past-due payments on the mortgage in lieu of
alimony when Respondent had been previously ordered to make those payments.
Where a party challenges the trial court's finding of fact, the appellate court first
determines whether the appellant has marshaled all of the evidence supporting the

4

court's findings and then demonstrates that the finding is against the clear weight
of the evidence. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Respondent's brief correctly sets forth the appropriate constitutional and statutory
provisions affecting the instant appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
Respondent's statement adequately addresses the nature of her appeal without the
need for additional comment.
Course of Proceedings
Respondent's statement here omits the fact that subsequent to a trial in this matter,
that on or about June 12, 2004, the trial court held a telephonic hearing pursuant to
Respondent's objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. At the
close of that hearing the trial court made two changes to the proposed order but left the
remaining findings intact. Thereafter, on or about July 22, 2004, Respondent filed her
Motion to Amend Findings. Subsequent to a hearing on that motion, the court left the
order intact but clarified its position that the award at issue was based on the principles of
equity that manifested throughout the trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent's statement of the facts wholly omits any statement of fact leading the
trial court to state that the Decree of Divorce was decided on equitable principles. See p
of the Amended Findings attached to Respondent's Addenda as Exhibit N. As such,
Respondent has wholly failed to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's findings.
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This failure is fatal to the present appeal. Nowhere in the appeal does Respondent infomi
the Court that the trial court heard evidence during the trial that established that
Respondent abandoned Petitioner while he was traveling for his employment. That on
his return he discovered that Respondent had emptied the bank accounts, taken one of
their cars worth $15,500 and sold it for another car worth considerably less, racked up
thousands of dollars in credit card bills, and forged Petitioner's name on documents
allowing her to obtain additional credit. Nowhere in the appeal does Respondent inform
the Court that when she returned from California that she entered the house, changed the
locks and forced Respondent to find alternative housing. That subsequent to returning to
the house, and as ordered by the trial court, that Respondent failed to make mortgage
payments and created the risk that he home would be lost to foreclosure. This evidence
would certainly support the trial court's finding that the Decree was based on equitable
principles as set forth in paragraph 3 of the Amended Findings.
Respondent fails to inform the Court that the parties had always used the imputed
income figure of $1,118.00 per month for purposes of imputing ability to pay and that
Respondent not once objected to this figure at trial when used for that purpose. Indeed,
Petitioner raised this objection for the first time incident to her Motion to Amend
Findings. See, Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition, attached as Exhibit L to
Respondent's Addenda.
It is not the appellee's obligation to marshal evidence that supports the trial
court's findings.. Rather, this obligation falls to the appellant. In the present case, the
Statement of Fact set forth by Respondent is bereft of evidence that would support the
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trial court's findings of fact. This absence prevents Respondent from demonstrating that
the trial court's findings of fact resisted the clear weight of evidence. This failure is fatal
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The burden of establishing the trial court's abuse of discretion falls to the
appellant (Respondent herein). To carry this burden Utah Law requires an appellant to
establish errors in both the fact-finding process and errors in the legal conclusions
reached attendant to that process. To establish such error the appellant is required to
marshal the evidence in favor of the finding of fact before arguing that such finding
contradicts the clear weight of the evidence presented. The appellant must then show that
the trial court made errors in its conclusions of law.
Respondent does not carry this burden. Respondent entirely fails to marshal any
evidence in support of the decision below and instead gives the Court the impression that
the trial court's decision is arbitrary and aberrant. The decision is neither. Instead the
trial court heard evidence that Respondent abandoned her husband, pilfered the bank
accounts, sold their car, racked up thousands and thousands of dollars in marital credit
card debt to support her lark, and forged her husband's name to obtain additional credit.
Then, once she returned to Utah, she secreted herself into the marital residence, changed
the locks, displaced her husband, and then failed to make mortgage payments on the
home creating the possibility of foreclosure. The trial court's findings clearly reflect the
weight of this evidence as per principles of equity.
With respect to Respondent's specific findings, coupled with her failure to
marshal evidence, Respondent's assertions border on bewildering. First, she asserts that
the trial court made no findings with respect to a net amount for purposes of calculating
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her monthly needs notwithstanding the fact that the parties had always used the stipulated
figure for purposes of such calculations.
Second, the court plainly stated in the Amended Findings that the $900.00 figure
did not increase Petitioner's ability to pay alimony insofar as he would use that amount to
pay the debt Respondent accumulated in connection with her lark.
Third, the Findings plainly state that value of the Chrysler that Respondent
unilaterally took and sold had the value of $15,500.00, not the Jeep that she acquired
subsequent to disposing of the Chrysler.
Fourth, the clear weight of the evidence established that the marital debt, the
money siphoned from the accounts and the debt incurred by Respondent during her
abandonment in the marital name significantly outweighed the equity in the home and
Respondent has marshaled no evidence to attack this finding.
Fifth, the court identified the nine thousand-dollar credit card debt in
Respondent's name as a debt incurred solely by Respondent incident to the separation.
Respondent has marshaled no evidence to attack this finding.
Sixth, as set forth above, the court determined that significant debt remained
subsequent to the application of the home's equity to that debt.
Seventh, as set forth above the court based its awards on principles of equity and
the court plainly stated that both parties had the ability to bear their own attorney's fees.
Eighth, Respondent failed to marshal evidence in connection with her opposition
to the Motion for Sanctions that would tend to establish that the trial court committed
error when it awarded sanctions to Petitioner in connection with Respondent's ill-advised
motion to compel.
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Ninth, the court clearly stated that insufficient evidence was presented to allow
the court to conclude that principles of equity would support the award.
ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.

Paragraph 3 of the Amended Findings unequivocally states that the present
Decree stems from a finding rooted in equity. But insofar as Respondent has failed to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's conclusions Respondent simply cannot
establish as a matter of procedure that those conclusions offend the clear weight of the
evidence presented. As this Court has repeatedly stated, "when an appellant fails to meet
the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence, appellate courts are bound to assume the
record supports the trial court's factual findings." Wade v. Stengl 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah
App. 1994).
Respondent's argument impresses the notion that the trial court's conclusions
abandon reason. But that argument ignores the clear weight of the evidence. At trial, the
court heard evidence establishing that Respondent abandoned her husband, drained the
bank accounts, unilaterally sold one the parties' cars, racked up thousands and thousands
of dollars in marital credit card debt to support her frolic, and forged her husband's name
to obtain additional credit. The court heard evidence establishing that when she returned,
she secreted herself into the marital residence, changed the locks, then failed to make
mortgage payments. The weight of this evidence prompted the court to issue the decree
on equitable principles, and this finding of fact finds support in Utah law: "the court may
consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)(b).
And insofar as considerable discretion vests with trial court with respect to awards of
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alimony and property, absent the marshaling of evidence, this Court simply should not
conclude that the trial court's conclusions lack factual support. As a matter of procedure,
Respondent's attacks on the trial court's findings of fact should be ignored and the trial
court affirmed.
II.

WITH RESPECT TO THE AWARDS NO ABUSE LIES.

"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and property
distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991).
In the present case, Respondent does not establish an abuse of discretion and the trial
court's awards should remain intact.
A.

Alimony.
As set forth in paragraph 8 of the decree, the trial court considered the Jones

factors as codified in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(a) to determine the allocation of
alimony. On those factors the trial court concluded that Respondent did not have the
ability to support herself or the capacity to meet her reasonable needs and expenses. The
court then concluded that Petitioner had the ability to contribute to Respondent's needs.
In her brief, Respondent attacks the court's findings with respect to her ability to
earn and Petitioner's ability to pay. The attack on the ability to earn is odd. As set forth
above, the parties stipulated to the amount that would be imputed to Respondent for
purposes of calculating her ability to meet expenses, and not once did Respondent
suggest at trial that this figure would be anything other than a net figure for purposes of
such calculations. As the record reflects, Respondent first raised this issue incident to
filing her Motion to Amend Findings. The trial court heard this argument and rejected it.
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The court used this figure to compute ability to meet expenses and the court clearly
intended this figure to be a net amount. Absent a marshaling of the evidence supported
by a showing of why the trial court's findings upset the clear weight of such evidence,
this finding should not be disturbed.
With respect to the issue of Petitioner's ability to pay, Respondent continues to
minimize the damage she created in connection with her massive accrual of debt and how
this debt continues to affect Petitioner's ability to pay. Moreover, much of Respondent's
argument centers on preliminary findings issued prior to the court hearing the full body of
evidence at trial. That evidence impacted the court's temporary order. As set forth
above, subsequent to abandoning her husband, Respondent accumulated debt at an
astonishing rate. She unilaterally sold marital assets for her private consumption while
amassing debt that far outstripped the parties' assets. These debts continue to persist, and
given Respondent's past actions and the fact that these outstanding debts would continue
to impact both parties, the court entrusted Respondent with the responsibility of repaying
these debts. As the court stated in paragraph 2 of the Amended Findings: "The Court
finds that due to the uneven distribution of debt to Petitioner and the order requiring
Petitioner to pay virtually all marital debt, the Court intentionally left the $900.00 in
expenses to assist Petitioner in paying the marital debt." Exhibit N. This was trial
court's finding, and Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence in support of this
finding before attacking it. This Court should correctly presume that the record supports
the trial court's finding with respect to this debt and Petitioner's ability to pay. The trial
court's finding should be affirmed.
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B.

Distribution of marital property.
"A trial court may elect to distribute marital property unequally when the

circumstances and needs of the parties dictate a departure from the general rule."
Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603 (Utah App. 1999). In the present case, the trial court
elected to distribute the property in a manner commensurate with the distribution of debt,
and Respondent has entirely mischaracterized the court's distribution without respect to
either the actual language of the order or the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the
trial court should be affirmed.
Respondent entirely fails to characterize paragraph 4 of the Decree correctly.
That paragraph states: "Further, Respondent shall be awarded the Chrysler automobile,
which was traded in for the Jeep, with an approximate value of $15,500.00. Petitioner
shall be awarded the truck, with an approximate value of $5,000.00 and the Marriott
timeshare with an approximate value of $8,000.00." Thus, with respect to paragraph 4,
Respondent has no grounds to attack the distribution.
With respect to paragraph 5, the court determined that it would divide the
property in a manner commensurate with an unequal distribution of debt. The court
entrusted Petitioner with the responsibility of re-paying this debt—much of which
Respondent incurred solely incident to her frolic—and to assist said repayment the court
awarded Respondent the equity from the home. This is not an abuse of discretion on its
face and Petitioner has utterly failed to marshal evidence in support of this finding before
showing why the finding opposes the clear weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial
court's finding should be affirmed.
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which was traded in for the Jeep, with an approximate value of $15,500.00. Petitioner
shall be awarded the truck, with an approximate value of $5,000.00 and the Marriott
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With respect to paragraph 5, the court determined that it would divide the
property in a manner commensurate with an unequal distribution of debt. The court
entrusted Petitioner with the responsibility of re-paying this debt—much of which
Respondent incurred solely incident to her frolic—and to assist said repayment the court
awarded Respondent the equity from the home. This is not an abuse of discretion on its
face and Petitioner has utterly failed to marshal evidence in support of this finding before
showing why the finding opposes the clear weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial
court's finding should be affirmed.
C.

Attorney's fees.
The decision to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings rests in the sound

discretion of the trial court. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
However, the award must be based on evidence of both financial need and
reasonableness. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Andersen v.
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
A trial court has the discretion to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings pursuant
to Utah Code § 30-3-3 (2001). Nowhere in this section does it say that a Trial Court
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must award attorneys fees. In this case, the court rightfully exercised their discretion
to elect not to award attorney's fees, the code states in pertinent part:
Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may
award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or
enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
The court was correct in their finding that each party should pay their respective
attorney fees. In ^[3 of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court
stated that this case was decided on equitable principles as set forth above. The
Respondent's actions contributed significantly to the dissipation of the marital assets. For
this reason, the Trial Court saw no reason to award attorney fees and this court should not
disturb this finding.
III.

PAST DUE ALIMONY.

As clearly set forth below, the trial court concluded that no judgment would attach
for past-due alimony owing to the confusion on both parties with respect to Petitioner's
payment of Respondent's outstanding obligations made in lieu of alimony. And again,
Respondent has marshaled no evidence in support of the trial court's finding before
attacking such finding. As set forth above, this flaw prevents Petitioner from advancing
the argument here. Moreover, as set forth in Exhibit L, Petitioner failed to present
evidence at trial with respect to this position and raised this issue for the first time
pursuant to the Motion to Amend Findings. Accordingly, this argument should be
denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to deny
Respondent's appeal.

DATED this

)

day of February, 2006.
COOK, SKEEN & ROBINSON

(NDALL L. SKEEN
Attorney for Appellee
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